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of the common law rule. He would not be deprived of the right
to excavate and enjoy the subsoil profits, which is a well recognized
right in the law of real property." Mining law has achieved this
desirable result in allowing a miner to follow a vein of ore under
the land
of his neighbor where the apex is on the miner's own
,
land."
In a recent New York Case," the existence of a sewer 150 ft.
beneath the surface was held not to be such an incumbrance as
would permit a clain for breach of covenant against incumbrances.
The court said: "It, therefore, appears that the old theory that the
title of an owner of real property extends indefinitely upward and
downward is no longer an accepted principle in its entirety. Title
above the surface is now limited to the extent to which the owner
of the soil may reasonably make use thereof. By analogy, the title
of an owner of the soil will not be extended to a depth below
ground beyond which the owner may not make use thereof."
It would certainly be regrettable to deprive human beings the
right to view the intricate and beautiful handiwork of nature confined within American caves, in order to satisfy a rule anciently
developed without foresight as to its possible consequences.
IRA G. STEPHENSON

COMPROMISE OF CONTRACT CLAIMSA CRITICISM OF TANNER V MERRILL
That the law loves a compromise is a familiar maxim. The
Kentucky Court has said' that it is "the peculiar duty of the Courts
of Justice to cherish and support" compromises, for the reason that
they contribute to the peace and quiet of the community.
Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines a compromise as an agreement based on mutual concessions.2 The reasoning of the court is
expressed in terms of consideration since each party has given up
something, frequently the right to have his claim decided in court.3
Three types of fact situations are generally classified as compromises,
although not all of them fit into this definition.
The first is the part payment of an undisputed debt then due.
The creditor may collect the balance by legal action, for there was
no consideration. The debtor did no more than he was bound to
do and the fact that the creditor gave a receipt in full is immatenal.'
121 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) sec. 253.
COSTIGAN, MnING LAW (1908) secs. 113, 114.
2 Boehrmger v Montalton, 142 Misc. 560, 254 N.Y.S. 276 (1931)
'Fisher v May's Heirs, 5 Ky ((2 Bibb) 448, at 450 (1811).
(1930) p. 250.
:Taylor v. Patrick, 4 Ky (1 Bibb) 168 (1808).
N. Y. Insurance Co. v. Van Meter's Adm'r., 137 Ky. 4, 121 S.W
438 (1909), Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106 (1876), Nixon v. Kiddy,
66 W Va. 355, 66 S.E. 500 (1909)
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In the second situation there is a bona fide dispute either
as to the existence of the claim or debt or the amount of it. The
parties may agree on terms between the two extremes clanned,
thus compronising the suit in the true sense,5 for each makes a concession and in so doing furnishes consideration for the concession
of the other. If the amount of the debt is disputed the matter may
be settled by another method, equally well accepted but resting
on a more doubtful basis. By this method the acceptance of any
amount as payment in full constitutes a complete settlement and
the debt is discharged. The law is said to look at a disputed claim
as a whole, without setting a value on it, and the adequacy of the
consideration will not be questioned. The soundness of this rule
will be considered later.
The third situation is one involving two claims, one disputed
and the other undisputed, in winch case payment of the latter
does not discharge the former?
The leading case involving the settlement of a debt of a disputed amount is Tanner v. Merril. The dispute concerned the
sum due an employee. There was no question as to the amount of
wages but the employer claimed the right to deduct the cost of the
transportation of the employee from the place of employment to the
place where the work was done. The protesting employee accepted
the amount the employer claimed to be due, giving a receipt in full,
and when he sued for the balance the appellate court held for
the employer by a three to two decision.
The courts refer to such settlements as compromises, but they
clearly do not fit into the definition of a compromise. A more
accurate term would be unconditional surrender, for the concession
is entirely on one side and the other has done no more tnan, by
his own admission, he is legally bound to do.
Tanner v. Merrill presents a challenging problem to winch three
approaches are possible. It may be regarded as (1) a single disputed claim, (2) two separate and distinct claims, or (3) a clain
and counter-claim.
The settlement of a single disputed claim by the payment of
the amount the debtor admits to be due is unsatisfactory to some
courts, winch hold that there is no consideration for the acceptance
of that amount and that the creditor can sue for and recover the
remainder
Conceding that the rule is sound in some situations
rApplicable to any dispute. Kelly v. Peter and Burghard Stone
Co., 130 Ky. 530, 133 S.W 486 (1908).
*1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) Sec. 128.
7

Shawnee Sanitary Milk Co. v. Fulkerson's Garage and Machine
Shop, 258 Ky. 639, 79 S.W (2d) 229 (1935).
S108 Mich. 58, 65 N.W 664 (1895).
*Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150, 114 N.W 733

(1908).
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it may be questioned whether it is applicable to the facts of Tanner
v. Merrill, for it is difficult to see how a claim for wages and a
claim for transportation paid can be regarded as a single claim.
In Demeules v. Jewel Tea Company" an employee deposited
a cash bond. Upon the termination of the employment the employer
returned only part of the amount deposited, claiming that the reThe employee accepted this but
mainder had been forfeited.
brought an action to recover the balance. He was allowed to recover, the court saying that the company had "suffered no detrit yielded nothing, and Demeules received nothing. If it
ment
had paid any greater sum whatever
there would have been
agreement to accept less.'"' The same
a consideration for the
court in an earlier case involving similar facts held that "The
transaction lacked another element usually found in these compromises, viz., mutual concessions."'
The Minnesota court left no room for doubt as to its position
in regard to Tanner v. Merrill. The facts in the case of Ness v. Minnesota and Colorado Company may be sufficiently differentiated
to explain the result, but the court said, "Perhaps the Michigan case
sustains his [defendant's] contention, but if it does, we expressly
decline to follow, because it is opposed to the general current of
authority."
The court which decided Tanner v. Merrill would have held
that a debtor who had paid only part of an undisputed debt had
not discharged the claim because he had furnished no consideration for his creditor's promise to accept that amount in full payment. Even if Tanner v. Merrill is regarded as a single claim there
seems to be little logic in saying that the receipt of part payment of
a claim, the whole of which is conceded, is not sufficient consideration, but that the rece.pt of payment of only the conceded portion
of a disputed claim is sufficient consideration'
The second approach to Tanner v. Merrill also illustrates the
third so-called compromise settlement. This view is that the case
presents not one undisputed claim but two distinct claims, one undisputed and the other disputed. It is clear that the payment of
the former is not sufficient consideration for the release of the
latter, and this is the position taken by the dissenting judges in
Tanner v. Merrill. One of them said, "I think that the payment of
an admitted indebtedness is no consideration for a discharge of a
further claim by the creditor."'
Ibzd.
Ibid at
-,
114 N.W at 734 (1908).
"De Mars v. Musser-Sauntry Land, L. and Manuf. Co., 37
Minn. 418, 35 N.W 1 at 2 (1887).
37 Minn. 413, 92 N.W 333 at 334 (1902)
"Whitmire v. Lawrence, Barry, and Stone Counties' Mutual
Benefit Ass'n, 286.S.W 842 (Mo. 1926).
1108 Mich. 58, 65 N.W 664, at 666 (1895)
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However, the difficulty often lies in determining whether there
are two clais or only one. One court has said"' that if the claims
are dependent on separate sets of facts the settlement of one will
not release the other. Another has held', that if the two claims arise
out of separate promises, even in the same contract, the payment
of one does not bar a recovery of the other. Many courts-and
among them the Kentucky court-have displayed a willingness to
find two claims instead of one, often without stating the test used.
It might be suspected that a dislike for the results of Tanner
v. Merrill has given rise to this willingness, which has culminated
in cases approachng the absurd. Thus a Michigan court held that
the case of Sweeney v. Adam Groth Company' involved two claims,
one for work done on the "interior" of the church and the other
for work done on the "exteror"'
The leading Kentucky case of the class under consideration,
Shawnee Sanitary Milk Company v. Fulkerson's Garage and Machine Shop,' is one in which the plaintiff contracted to keep the
defendant's trucks in repair at a flat monthly rate. A dispute arose
as to whether this contract included work on the bodies of the
trucks as well as on the motors. The defendant gave the plaintiff
a check marked "account in full", which the latter indorsed and
cashed. The court regarded the amount due for work done on the
motors as undisputed, with the work on the bodies constituting a
separate claim. "The appellant was under a legal duty to appellee
to pay the amount admitted to be due, and Ins performance of that
duty was no consideration for the discharge of another debt about
which there wasno dispute."'
The third possible approach to Tanner v. Merrill-to consider
it as presenting a counter-claim situation-would appear to be the
soundest. Unfortunately, however, this view of the case does not
-end the difeulty, for there are opposing opinions as to the rule to
be applied in such cases.2 '
Some courts hold that if the debtor asserts a counter-claim,
which is disputed, the entire claim becomes disputed so that the
payment of any sum constitutes a final settlement under the single
disputed clai rule." If this rule is sound, Tanner v. Merrill is right.
"Keene v. Gauen, 22 F (2d) 723 (C.C.A. 5th, 1927).
'Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Lightsey, 49 F (2d)
586 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931).
"269 Mich. 436, 257 N.W 855 (1934).
"258 Ky. 639, 79 S.W (2d) 229 (1935).
=Ibid at 642, 79 S.W (2d) at 230 (1935); Walston v. F D.
Calkins Co., 119 Iowa 150, 93 N.W 49 (1903), Shumaker v. Lucernern-Maine Community Ass'n, 275 Mass. 201, 175 N.E. 469 (1931);
Marion v. Hermbach, 62 Minn. 214, 64 N.W 386 (1895), Manse v.
Hossmgton, 205 N. Y. 33, 98 N.E. 203 (1912).
'1I C.J.S., Accord and Satisfaction (1936) Sec. 32 at 520.
=Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co., v. So. Colo. Mercantile Co.,
65 Colo. 587, 178 Pac. 577 (1919), Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 14.C.
432, 107 S.E. 451 (1921).
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But is it sound? The criticism may still be made that there is lack
of consideration, and it may be doubted whether the presence

of a counter-claim zpso facto creates a single disputed claim.

It

seems more logical to say that it creates a two-claim situation.
Still another criticism is possible.

It has been pointed out that

by merely asserting a counter-claim, m good faith, the debtor
assumes a position which permits him to force upon the creditor
the amount the former claims to be due. That this must be
made in good faith does not lessen the injustice of allowing the

debtor to put the creditor in the position either of being compelled
to wait indefinitely for what is due him or of accepting a lesser
amount in full satisfaction. This is particularly true in employment cases because of the unequal economic positions of the parties.
Tanner v. Merrill provides an excellent illustration of this inequality The employer's claim even though made in good faith may
have been totally unfounded, but the employe, needing money
b'cause of illness at home, accepted the amount tendered by the
employer and thereby gave up the right to have the claim decided
on the evide4ce. Aside from the questionable justice of such a rule,
let it be repeated that he received nothing m exchange for giving
up his right to have the counter-claim decided in court.
The effect of such a rule is to force the creditor to wait for
the amount admittedly due hun until the right of the counter-claim
has been determined in court, under penalty of losing his claim
to the disputed amount entirely by accepting the amount tendered.
A New York court, in refusing to follow the counter-claim rule,
expressed this view very clearly when it said that thq defendant
"could not, by paying an amount admittedly due in any event,
foreclose plaintiffs from claimng that more was due, nor yet subject them to the risk of postponing the payment of the whole claim
until defendant's
relatively small counter-claim had been judicially
liquidated."'
Some courts have held that the rule is applicable only to
counter-claims, not set-offs,' while others have held that it applies
to both.- A counter-clain is to be distinguished from a set-dff in
that in the former the defendant's claun against the plaintiff arises
from the transaction in connection with which he is being sued,'
whereas in the latter. his claim is based upon a different transaction.'
Courts are not always careful to differentiate between the
two terms, frequently using them interchangeably. Certain courts,
however, have refused to follow the rule in either case, holding
Frank et al. v Vogt, 178 N.Y. App. Div. 833 at 834, 166 N.Y.S.
175 at 176 (1917).
21I C.J.S., Accord and Satisfaction (1936) Sec. 32 at 520.
'Ex parte So. Cotton Oil Co., 207 Ala. 704, 93 So. 662 (1922),
Brent v. Whittington, 214 Ala. 613, 108 So. 567 (1926).
Ballentine Law Dictionary (1930) at 297.
Ibid at 1191.
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that the debtor in accepting the money has -not lost his right to
sue and recover.' Under this view the employee m Tanner v.
Merrill should have been allowed to have the counter-claim decided
upon the evidence.
Another method frequently employed in avoiding the Tanner
v. Merrill rule is to find that the creditor did not clearly understand that the payment was made in full satisfaction of all claims. =
This view is scarcely convincing since most of the cases involve
checks marked payment in full, often adding, of all claims. The
least that can be said is that the courts are very liberal in finding
that the creditor was reasonable m failing to understand the terms
of the payment.
Even a casual reading of such cases leads to the belief that
many courts, including Kentucky, while supposedly following Tanner v. -Merrll,are quite willing, perhaps even eager, -to be convinced that a given set of facts can be differentiatea from'that case
and a contra result obtained. -It is suggested that'this is due to- a
conviction that the principal case rests on a doubtful legal basis
and is equally questionable from the point of view of attaining
'justice.
ROSAiWNA A. BLAKE

WHEN DOES PREPARATION FOR CRIME BECOME
A CRIMINAL ATTEMPT?
The law of criminal attempts presents two principal problems.
One of these is the effect of impossibility, and the other involves
determining when preparation for a crime becomes a criminal
attempt. It has been suggested that impossibility is no bar to
making out the crime if the defendant reasonably -expected -to
succeed with the means he was usmg.
If the defenaant' could
not have reasonably expected to succeed, thenk the necessary
specific intent cannot be shown, and thus the- crime cannot be made
out. Impossibility, in this view, is important only -for its bearing upon specific intent. In this paper the - theory will be advanced that preparation becomes a crime when the preparatory
acts are of such an unequivocal nature that a criminal design
is manifest.
In the cases to be cited subsequently, the language
is to the effect that while the act need not be the last proximate
step before consumation, yet it must be beyond mere preparation;
it-must be an act directly tending toward commission of the crime.
Tha effect of holding that an act of preparation is too remote from
'Fairfield v. Corbett Hardware Co., 25 Ariz. 199, 215 Pac. 510
(1923), Robinson v. Leatherbee Tie and Lumber Co., 120 Ga. 901,
48 S.E. 380 (1904), Perlitch v. Kanner, 171 N.Y.S. 148 (1918).
109 Ky.388, 59 S.W 323 (1900)
"Note (1943) 31 Ky.L. J. 270.

